COSMO · STUDY + TEACHING DECK

Decision Science

May 10, 2026

A question worth sharing

Game Theory

Analyze strategic choices by separating actions, payoffs, and responses.

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Today’s route

A question becomes an explanation.

Try

Enter through a problem. A partial attempt counts.

Connect

Use strategy, best response, Nash equilibrium to name what you notice.

Convince

Build an argument a partner can check.

The goal is a method someone else can use.

The opener

Start with a question.

Opening problem

In rock-paper-scissors, does any pure strategy dominate?

Think · 2 min

Sketch, test a small case, or make a first guess.

Pair · 3 min

Compare methods. Find one thing you agree on and one question.

Be ready to share your route, even if it is unfinished.

Compare before checking

Put two attempts in conversation.

Explain

Tell a partner how you started. Let them finish before responding.

Question

Which step feels certain? Which step still needs evidence?

Build

Combine one useful idea from each attempt into a new route.

Can you explain your partner’s method in your own words?

Board conversation

Notice before naming.

Look for structure

Try a small case and record every step.
Separate what changes from what stays fixed.
State the pattern in a sentence before naming the theorem.

Make a conjecture

We think ___ because ___. A case that might break this is ___.

What changed? What stayed the same?

Useful language

Now the language has a job.

strategy

complete rule for choosing actions

best response

payoff-maximizing reply

Nash equilibrium

profile where no player gains by changing alone

Use one of these words to explain something you already noticed.

The core idea

Keep the idea. Explain the conditions.

u_i(s_i^*,s_{-i}^*)\ge u_i(s_i,s_{-i}^*)\qquad\text{for every player }i\text{ and action }s_i

The idea

Analyze strategic choices by separating actions, payoffs, and responses.

What to remember

Strategic stability is about responses, not necessarily fairness or total value.

What information does this method keep?

Worked example

One route, one decision at a time

The problem

Find pure Nash equilibria in a coordination game with payoffs (2,2) on A,A; (1,1) on B,B; and (0,0) off diagonal.

Predict each next step

At A,A neither player benefits by switching.
At B,B neither player benefits by switching.
Off-diagonal outcomes invite a profitable switch.
The pure equilibria are A,A and B,B.

Which step needs a reason, not just a calculation?

See the structure

The structure behind game theory

u_i(s_i^*,s_{-i}^*)\ge u_i(s_i,s_{-i}^*)\qquad\text{for every player }i\text{ and action }s_i

A pure Nash equilibrium prevents any one player from benefiting by changing alone.

Read the representation

Analyze strategic choices by separating actions, payoffs, and responses.

Look together

Point to the part that explains the relationship. Change one input and predict what changes.

What can you see here that was harder to see in words?

Two approaches

Compare the reasoning.

Structural method

Name the objects and conditions.
Use a reusable relationship.
Explain why the method must work.

Brute force

May help with a small test case.
Can hide the general reason.
Becomes unreliable when the scale grows.

Which route can you justify? What would you test first?

Reasoning clinic

Find the step that needs repair.

Investigate these concerns

May help with a small test case.
Can hide the general reason.
Becomes unreliable when the scale grows.

Repair together

Name the missing condition. Try a small counterexample. Rewrite one step so it is justified.

A useful correction explains why the original step fails.

Work together

Investigate game theory

Your shared task

Pairs play repeated payoff games, estimate best responses, and test whether outcomes are stable.

Explore

4 min - test cases

Compare

5 min - form a rule

Defend

4 min - defend the rule

Everyone should be able to explain the group’s final claim.

Share → connect

What did the room discover?

Bring your evidence

Share a conjecture, a useful example, or a route that changed.

Connections to investigate

Strategic stability is about responses, not necessarily fairness or total value.
A complete solution names the condition that makes the method valid.
A counterexample is useful when it exposes a missing condition.

Which observation explains the mechanism?

Try → explain → check

Your turn to build the route

The problem

In a two-player game, (C,C) pays (3,3), (D,C) pays (5,0), (C,D) pays (0,5), and (D,D) pays (1,1). Find each player's dominant strategy.

Predict each next step

If the opponent chooses C, choosing D pays 5 instead of 3.
If the opponent chooses D, choosing D pays 1 instead of 0.
By symmetry D is strictly dominant for both players.
Thus (D,D) is an equilibrium, although (C,C) pays both players more.

Which step needs a reason, not just a calculation?

Convince a skeptic

Turn a pattern into a proof.

The claim

A Nash equilibrium need not maximize total payoff.

Build the argument

In the coordination example, (B,B) is an equilibrium: switching alone reduces payoff from 1 to 0.
Its total payoff is 2, while (A,A) has total payoff 4.
Equilibrium blocks unilateral improvement; it does not rule out a better coordinated move.

What does each step rely on? Where are the conditions used?

Stretch together

Take the idea somewhere new.

Transfer challenge

Give a symmetric mixed strategy for rock-paper-scissors.

Choose a route

Name the objects, the conditions, and a relationship that might help. Start with one test case.

What transfers from the earlier example? What is different?

Peer review

Check the argument together.

Restate

Explain the other person’s route before evaluating it.

Test

Try a small case or boundary case. Does every step still make sense?

Revise

Fix an assumption, add a reason, or find a second method.

Where did your thinking change?

Beyond this problem

Where might this idea help?

A connection

Game theory informs auctions, negotiations, network incentives, and competitive algorithms.

Discuss the model

What objects or quantities are represented?
Which relationship from today is preserved?
What assumption would you check before trusting it?

Invent one more situation with the same structure.

Exit ticket

Leave with an explanation.

Question 1

In rock-paper-scissors, does any pure strategy dominate?

Question 2

Explain why this claim is true: A Nash equilibrium need not maximize total payoff.

Question 3

Give a symmetric mixed strategy for rock-paper-scissors.

Choose one. Write an answer with a reason, then compare with a partner.

Reflect together

Make your thinking visible.

I used to think…

Name a claim or approach that changed.

Now I can explain…

Give the reason, not only the result.

I still wonder…

Write a question worth bringing to the next circle.

Share one sentence. Ask one follow-up question.

The idea to keep

Strategic stability is about responses, not necessarily fairness or total value.

Use the matching practice sets to move from direct examples to proof and transfer.

A good question belongs to everyone in the room.